
Peace Enforcement in the Vacuum of Peace Keeping for the Bosnia Conflict and the Srebrenica Massacre

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Abstract

There is a great vacuum in the peacekeeping rules of engagement of the United Nations. This was made most manifest in the Srebrenica Massacre, an episode of the Bosnian Conflict, whereby more than 8000 Muslims were slaughtered in what is indisputably the highest single killings in Europe since the Second World War. The objective of the study is to discuss the background and causal factors of the Bosnia conflict with particular emphasis on the Srebrenica Massacre; to find out why the peacekeeping operation of the United Nations was not effective in combating the conflict; to assess the peace enforcement mechanism of NATO and how it filled the vacuum of conventional peace-keeping. The theoretical framework of the study is a blend of the Power Theory and the Clash of Civilization Theory. The qualitative research methodology was adopted for the study. It consists of content and documentary analysis whereby data was gathered mainly through secondary sources and reviewed. The study found out that the crux of the vacuum is the rule of engagement whereby UN peacekeepers are only permitted to attack if they were themselves attacked. The study concludes that Peace Enforcement as introduced by NATO is more realistic in such a conflict. The peace enforcement operation compelled the warring factions to the negotiation table and gave birth to the Dayton Peace Accord. The study recommends that the Peace Enforcement operations of the United Nations should be overhauled and reinforced so as not to depend on NATO. This is because NATO was originally designed for the Collective Defense of the North Atlantic area.

1. Introduction

There was a great vacuum in the peacekeeping rules of engagement of the United Nations. This was made most manifest in the Srebrenica Massacre whereby more than 8000 Muslims were slaughtered in what is indisputably the highest single killings in Europe since the Second World War. This grievous atrocity was perpetrated by Serbian troops under the command of General Ratko Mladic. What is more intriguing was that the genocide was committed in areas designated as United Nations Safe Havens and heavy presence of UN troops.

Religion was also a major causal factor of the Bosnian crisis and was the bases for prosecuting victims. It was also used as rhetoric by belligerents to incite and spur aggression and to justify atrocious actions. The attacks on Bosniaks were rationalized on the grounds of defending Europe from looming Islamic expansion as it was alleged that the Bosniak Moslems were planning to expand through the Islamization of surrounding territories.

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The theoretical framework of the study is a blend of the Power Theory and the Clash of Civilization Theory. The Srebrenica Massacre in the Bosnia conflict has the propensity of

supporting as well as debunking the Clash of Civilization theory of Samuel Huntington. It supports the theory because the war was fundamentally a clash between Christians and Muslims. Western countries were initially reluctant to intervene because when Bosniaks were critically under siege for reasons that border on clash of civilization. Iran, Pakistan and other Islamic countries rallied around the Bosniak population because of their religious affiliation. However, Operation Deliberate Force against the Army of the Republika Srpska after the Srebrenica massacre was a case of Western Civilization under the auspices of the United States led NATO safeguarding the annihilation of Islamic Civilization in Europe. The Clash of Civilization is a theory propounded by Samuel Huntington. The theory holds the view that: “The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington 1996:2) “The next world war, if there is one, will be a war between civilizations.” The most important disparity between people have ceased to be ideological, political or economic. Patterns of cohesion will intensify amongst cultural affiliations and wars will take place between different religions. (Huntington 1996)

The Power Theory is synonymous with Realism which holds the view that sovereign states are primarily motivated by the struggle and pursuit of power in the international system. According to Scott Burchill “Political realism, Realpolitik, ‘power politics’, is the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of international relations” (Burchill 2001) Realism has been a prominent theory of international relations from the very beginnings but gained greatest prominence with the writings of Hans Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, George Kannan, Henry Kissinger etc. These scholars are regarded as the major proponents of realism.

Hans Morgenthau is a major progenitor or founder of classical realism. In the book *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Morgenthau gave an exposition of realism hinged on power pursuit propensity of states which is derived from the natural nature of human beings as power mongers or maximisers. Morgenthau noted that international politics is the struggle for power and that the struggle for power is universal in time and space. (Vasquez 1998) Ethical considerations must give way to ‘reasons of state’ (*raison d’état*) and universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states’ (Burchill 2001) According to John Baylis “the work of the high priest of post-war Realism, Hans J. Morgenthau... notes, politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Baylis and Smith 2001) Power is very important in the realist lexicon and has been defined in military strategic terms. Power is the ability to get what you want either through the threat of force or use of force. (Baylis and Smith 2001).

Power is the decisive factor in determining the country that will prevail in a conflict. Peace would be achieved from a distribution of power among states. “The game of international politics revolves around the pursuit of power: acquiring it, increasing it, projecting it, and using it to bend others to one’s will” (Waheeda 2015). Realism claims to give an account of international politics that is ‘realistic’ and predicated on the hard-headed and devoid of wishful thinking or deluded moralizing. From the perspective of realist, international politics revolves around power and self-interest (Heyford 2011). State-centrism and rationality are usually identified as core realist premises (Burchill 2001).

The qualitative research methodology was adopted for the study. It consists of content and documentary analysis whereby data was gathered mainly through secondary sources and reviewed. The article is divided into six sections. We are already in the first section which is the introduction. The second section would discuss the Bosnian War and the Srebrenica Massacre while the third section would discuss the causal factors of Bosnian War. Section four deals with peace keeping and peace enforcement, section five discusses forceful mediation in the vacuum of mediation while section six is the conclusion and recommendation.

2. Bosnia War and Srebrenica Massacre


The Bosnian War was the most gruesome war in Europe since the end of the Second World War. It was a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina that tilted towards an international armed conflict because of the participation of Croatia and Serbia (Boug and Shoup 2001). The Bosnian War started on the 6th of April 1992 and ended on the 14th of December, 1995. The war commenced when the Yugoslav army invaded the Bosnian capital sequel to its secession or declaration of independence.

There were three major factions or belligerents in the war and these are Herzeg-Bosnia (Bosnian Croats), Republika Srpska (Bosnian Serbs) and Bosniaks. At a stage the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croat (Herzeg-Bosnia) formed a coalition to contain the might of the Serbs (Yugoslavs) that controlled forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bethlehem and Marc 1997). Bosniak was loyal to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Croat loyal to the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Croatia while the Serbs (Yugoslav) were loyal to the Republika Srpska and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Initially the conflict was between the Yugoslav Army units in Bosnia on the one hand and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (comprising Bosniak and Croat forces) on the other hand. Later the Yugoslav Army units transformed into the Army of Republika Srpska. Misunderstanding and disputes between Bosniaks and Croats eventually gave rise to the Croat-Bosniak War in early 1993 but this was quickly settled in the Washington agreement of 1994.

The Serbs registered great victories at the wake of the conflict because the Yugoslav People's Army was dominated by them and have stockpiled enough weapons. The initial victories of the Serbs were reversed when the Bosniaks and Croats formed an alliance and created the Federation of Bosnia and Hergovina under the auspices of the Washington agreement of 1994. This alliance greatly challenged the gains of the Republic of Srpska. It was such that the Bosniak and Croat forces formed a coalition against the Serb forces. Despite the very higher numerical strength of this coalition, the Serbs had the upper hand sequel to the massive weaponry that was made available to them by the Yugoslav People's Army. With this military might they established dominion over much of the territory (New World Encyclopedia).

The arms embargo placed on Bosnia-Herzegovina increased the prospects of the Serb forces to the detriment of the Bosniaks because the Serbian and Croatian armies had heavily stocked arms and ammunition before the war. It is for this reason that the Bosniaks incessantly agitated for the lifting of the arms embargo (Akyol 2015)



There are vast and varied estimation of the death toll of the war. “The United Nations’ agencies had previously estimated 278,000 dead and missing persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also recorded around 1,325,000 refugees and exiles” (New World Encyclopedia). The Bosnian government in contrast estimated the death toll to be around 200,000. A very comprehensive and realist database was compiled by the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Center (RDC). The RDC Death Toll Database is such that it claimed the lives of 63,994 Bosniaks (66.7%), 24,206 Serbs (25.2%); 7,338 Croats (7.6%) and 637 of other nationalities which is the equivalent of 0.7% (Ewa and Bijak 2008).

In the case of the **Srebrenica massacre**, the Army of Republika Srpska (Serb troops) under the command of Ratko Mladic invaded Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 and killed 8000 Muslims. This was despite the fact that Srebrenica was a UN Safe Area with heavy presence of the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. On ground in Srebrenica during the massacre was a 400-strong contingent of Dutch peacekeepers but they were helpless in preventing the genocide. The genocide was such that most women were expelled from Bosniak-held territory and systematically raped or forced into marriage (Tanner 2001). It became a haunting symbol of the powerlessness of the United Nations peace keeping operations in major conflicts (Sveen 2017).

3. Causal Factors of the Bosnia War

The major causal factors of the Bosnia War are historical heritage, religion, external aggression, the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, ethnicity, and secession through referendum.

Let us begin with **historical heritage**. The Kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia had existed as autonomous states in Medieval times but at a time the territory of Bosnia was encroached upon by both Serbia and Bosnia. Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia were eventually conquered by the Ottoman Empire. During the period of the siege a great majority of the people of Bosnia were converted into Islam but Serbia and Croatia retained their faith as Orthodox and Roman Catholics respectively. What was eventually called the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1929 began with the formation of 1818 comprising the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. At the monarchical period, Serbia exercised hegemonic control over Yugoslavia (Tanner 2001).

Yugoslavia became a socialist country after the Second World War with Josip Broz Tito as the dictatorial president. President Tito ruled the six republics of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia namely Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia. His death in 1980 generated turbulent political tension in Yugoslavia but this power vacuum was quickly filled by Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia who also strived to expand the political influence of the Serbians within the federation. The dominant position of Serbia in the federation became a threat to Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina who wanted greater sense of belonging through a power-sharing arrangement or outright independence. The conflict of the desire for Serbia to continue its hegemonic control of the other ethnic groups of the federation and the quest for a power-sharing arrangement gave rise to the declaration of independence on June 1991 by Slovenia and Croatia. This model was attempted by Bosnia-Herzegovina but triggered the Bosnian Conflict (Rogel 1998), (Sveen 2017).

Religion was also a major causal factor of the Bosnian crisis and was the bases for prosecuting victims. It was also used as rhetoric by belligerents to incite and spur aggression and to justify atrocious actions. The attacks on Bosniaks were rationalized on the grounds of defending Europe from looming Islamic expansion as it was alleged that the Bosniak Moslems were planning to expand through the Islamization of surrounding territories. Serbia and Bosnia made a case to the effect that as Christian nations, their military might would serve as buffer against Islamist expansion to Europe. (New World Encyclopedia).

The hatred for Bosnian Muslims has been in existence since the 14th century when the Serbs were defeated by the Ottomans in 1389 at Kosova. The Serb Prince Lazar was killed in that battle and he became a Christ-like figure killed by the enemies of Christ in the Serbian myth. This began the animosity as Muslims were seen as Christ-killers. Eventually Slavs got converted to Islam and were accused of betraying their race as well as Christianity. Muslim converts were derogatorily classified as Turks and discriminated against. They were regarded as greedy cowards and this characterization became genetic and infested all Bosnian Muslims. By becoming Muslims, Serbs and Croats were of the view that Bosniaks had forfeited claims to the land. It was also the premise for the voracious destruction of any sign of Muslim habitation such as Islamic institutions and Mosques. The Bosnian Muslims depended for survival in the war on volunteers from the Muslim world like Iran, Pakistan etc. (Sells 1998).

In contravention of the United Nations Ban on arms and ammunition, the Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan secretly supplied Bosnian Muslims with guided anti-tank missiles and other sophisticated weapons to give them a fighting chance against the Serbs. This in no little way assisted Bosnian Muslims to recover from the Serbian siege (Abbas 2015), (Wiebes 2003).

External aggression in no little measure contributed to the conflict. This was with the instrumentality of Serbia and Croatia. Evidently the Bosnian Serb army were supplied and controlled by the Yugoslav army (Bourg and Shoup 2000). The involvement of Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro made the conflict to tilt towards aggression (New World Encyclopedia). The quest for power and territorial control were also major causal factors of the war. The war was propelled by internal forces struggling for power in an arrangement with no clearly defined power sharing formula (Bourg and Shoup 2000). The conflict was also triggered by the quest for territorial control over the former Yugoslavia (Sveen 2017).

The **dissolution of Yugoslavia** is of particular interest and constitute another major causal factor of the conflict. Tension started to build-up with the death of President Josip Broz Tito in 1980. There had always been separatist ideologies especially with Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina but this was facilitated with the collapse of the Communist System and end of the Cold War. The dissolution of Yugoslavia began with the secession of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991. The attempt of Bosnia and Herzegovina to do the same precipitated the war.

The intricate multi-ethnic composition (**ethnicity**) of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the major conflictual issue in the secessionist bid. Bosnia-Herzegovina was composed of 44% Muslim Bosniaks, 32.5 percent of Orthodox Serbs and 17% of Catholic Croats. The rejection of the secessionist bid referendum by the Bosnian Serbs was a major causal factor of the conflict. Ethnicity is the premise for the major military backing of Bosnian Serbs by Serbia and Bosnian Croats by Croatia (Bourg and Shoup 2000).

Secession through referendum another major causal factor of the war. As earlier indicated the dominance of the Serbs in Yugoslavia was not in the interest of other ethnic groups and made them to seek for better and more attractive options. Bosnia-Herzegovina attempted to secede through a referendum which declared them independent on March 5, 1992 but was resisted by the Serb political leadership. Secession also compounded the war as the Croatian community of Herzeg-Bosnia seceded and this triggered a major war between the Croats and Bosniaks (New World Encyclopedia).

4. Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement

Practical response to international conflicts with regard to ending hostilities and restoring peace involves operations by multinational forces of the United Nations and other international and regional organizations. These operations normally take the shape of: (1) Peace Keeping (2) Peace Enforcement (3) Peace Making and (4) Peace Building.

Peacekeeping are operations by multinational forces under the mandate of the United Nations for the containment of hostilities between belligerents in a major conflict or war. The mission of peacekeeping is to create a barrier or protection for the belligerents that upholds the truce or ceasefire and forestalls renewal of hostilities. The peacekeeping force only monitors the implementation of the signed truce without interference in the sense of more negotiations. Issues that involve negotiation, reconciliation, arbitration, judicial settlements and actual peacemaking are handled by the Peacemaking team. Although technically limited to an observer group, peacekeeping is sometimes used to refer to the entire process of maintaining peace as embedded in Chapters VI and VII of the United Nations Charter. It is on this premise that Lara Sloane says that “Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through peaceful third-party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to maintain peace” (Sloane 2001). This is a very holistic and comprehensive definition but could be misleading when distinguishing the differences between peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement and peace-building.

The attributes of peacekeeping are:

1. Peacekeeping operations normally commences when belligerents sign a truce or ceasefire
2. Its mission usually involves monitoring and supervising a truce or cease-fire agreed to by two or more former combatants.
3. It does not meddle itself with more negotiations which is a function of the peacemaking mission
4. Peacekeeping operations is hinged on the willingness of the belligerents to honour the truce and respect the authority of the peacekeepers
5. Peacekeeping forces must be recognized as neutral by the warring factions
6. Peacekeeping forces are lightly armed, defensively oriented observer force. Invariably their perception is that use of force will not be required to carry out their tasks, except in self-defense

7. They must maintain a posture of impartiality and neutrality toward the former belligerents.
8. They possess a quality often called the "hostage effect" that is operating under restrictive rules of engagement and depending on belligerents for their safety. This conception allows the force free movement and unrestricted access in the host state.

In the case of Peacekeeping the warring factions approve, recognize and appreciate the mandate of the operation as they are genuinely desirous of peace. The peacekeepers maintain peace by waging a barrier between the belligerents in an unbiased fashion. This is the reason why neutral nations are deployed for peacekeeping operations. The use of multinational forces as a buffer between belligerents awaiting troop withdrawals and negotiations as a rule of engagement in peacekeeping began with the 1956 Suez Crisis between Egypt, Israel, France, and the United Kingdom. Peacekeeping missions come in different shapes but the common denominator that it is designed to be peaceful and involves multilateral military troops under the auspices and authority of the UN Security Council” (Jacques 1991).

They are sometimes called the “Blue Helmets” and only allowed to use force on self-defense purposes. Peace Keeping Operations is only mandated in situations where there is a truce and the belligerents are ready to lay down their arms and embrace negotiated peace. For this reason, peace keeping missions always seek the consent and approval of the belligerents (parties to the conflict) before commencing operation.

Peace-Enforcement is the operation designed to end hostilities between belligerents who have not signed a truce or ceasefire agreement and the environment is hostile for a peacekeeping operation as the warring factions are opposed to interventions. In this case the United Nations and other international organizations attempts to enforce or impose peace between the warring parties. According to Lara Sloane, “Peace Enforcement is military operations by sea, air or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security, whether or not the belligerents are consenting to the intervention” (Sloane 2001). In peace enforcement the belligerents are compelled to cease fire through the use of overwhelming armed forces of mandated multinational forces. Force can be introduced to create requisite peaceful ends such as safe-havens for victims of the war. Peace Enforcement is also used by the United Nations to depict forceful actions with the goal of achieving of making peace or creating a sustainable cease fire or to reinstate a failed cease fire. It is more like declaring war to end war but unlike war normal wars, enforcement operation aims at settlement and not victory. For this reason, the operation is restrained by political factors designed to bring warring parties to the negotiating table (Sloane 2001).

Some of the elements or attributes of peace-enforcement are:

1. Peace-enforcement operation combats an ongoing war without a ceasefire or truce and invariably declares war on the ongoing war to make peace.
2. Armed confrontations and not peaceful separations or negotiations characterize peace-enforcement
3. Peace-enforcers are not peaceful mediators but active fighters whose mission is to compel a cease fire that is opposed to the belligerents
4. One or more of the belligerents normally confronts and attacks the mission preferring to have it their own way.
5. Unlike peacekeeping, peace-enforcement operatives are not welcomed by the warring factions
6. Unlike peacekeeping, peace-enforcers lose their neutrality and are invariably seen as adversaries and not allies

7. Like peacekeeping, peace-enforcement is eventually consolidated with peacemaking and peace-building

Evidently peace enforcement operations are normally outside the scope of the United Nations capacity to plan, command, and control. This may be because of its rules of engagement. They may be more effectively executed by a coalition of states such as NATO. Peace enforcement operations normally infringes state sovereignty. This is particularly the case when the mission takes place on the territory of combatants that are opposed to peace and have not invited the peace enforcers for intervention. Peace-enforcement operations by regional international organisations can only gain legitimacy when approved by the United Nations Security Council. Unlike peacekeeping, enforcement requires highly sophisticated and a full range of military capabilities that has the ability overwhelmingly exceed that of the combatant. Although the ideal goal is the commitment of superior military force to deter and dissuade warring factions from continuing the war. Despite positive expectation of deterrence to cease hostilities, deployed forces are expected to use all necessary means to restore peace (Sloane 2001).

The problem with peace-enforcement is that if not properly complimented with peace-making it becomes counterproductive. This is because the peace enforcers have to first and foremost fight their way into the conflict in the effort to enforce a ceasefire that does not exist. In the process they would inflict heavy casualties on the belligerent and also suffer inevitable casualties. More importantly peace enforcement will not solve the outstanding difficulties associated with potential application. The exertion of force to forestall combat should be efficient in making the continuation of violence undesirable. On its own it cannot create the conditions for lasting peace, which revolves around the political acceptance of peace as more beneficial than war. Nevertheless, the imposition of outside force may tame the cycle of violence and persuade the warring factions that challenging to the peace enforcers does more harm than good in relation compliance to an imposed peace (Sloane 2001).

5. Forceful Mediation in the Vacuum of Persuasion

Evidently there was a vacuum in the attempt to persuade or peacefully mediate the Bosnian conflict and this made the conflict to linger with very heavy casualties. Peacekeeping from the conception of the United Nations has a rule of engagement which only permits the peacekeepers to shoot when they are attacked. Warring factions sometimes take advantage of this rule of engagement to perpetrate heinous atrocities while the UN Peacekeepers do little or nothing to stop such genocidal killings. This was the case during the April-July 1994 genocide in Rwanda and was also the case in the Srebrenica massacre of July 1995. Obviously “the 1995 Srebrenica massacre became a haunting symbol of the United Nations' powerlessness to enforce international law in times of civil war” (Sveen 2017).

Another major weakness or vacuum in the peacekeeping mechanism of the United Nations was in the implementation of the arms embargo. On 25 September 1991, Resolution 713 was passed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This resolution imposed an embargo on the territories of the former Yugoslavia. However, the embargo was not enforced to the latter and some countries like Pakistan took advantage of the vacuum to supply arms to the Bosnian Muslims. Also, the Croatian Army smuggled a number of weapons through its coast under the watch of the United Nations.

Other measures were taken by the United Nations to make peace in the Bosnia conflict to no avail. On 21 February 1992 the United Nations Security Council Resolution 743 was enacted. This resolution created the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). The Vance-Owen Peace Plan was also presented as a way for peace by Cyrus Vance (UN Special

Envoy) and David Owen (EC Representative). Under the auspices of the United Nations a number of cease-fire agreements were signed and subsequently breached to gain undue advantage by one of the sides in the conflict. This may be attributed to the fact that United Nations peacekeepers for the Bosnia conflict were too small to effectively intervene. "The United Nations repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted to stop the war and the much-touted peace plans offered before and during the Bosnian War made little impact" (New World Encyclopedia).

The vacuum of persuasion in the mediation of the United Nations was filled by the forceful mediation and intervention of NATO. The coordinated offences by NATO actively began 28 February 1994 when it shot down four Serb aircraft over central Bosnia because it violated the UN no-fly zone (New World Encyclopedia). Earlier, at the request of the United Nations, NATO launched air strikes on artillery and mortar targets in Sarajevo that constituted a threat to the desired peace (Christia 2012).

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) realizing the indispensability of force in mediation called for the assistance of NATO and there were air strikes and bombing on the Serbian military command outpost near Gorzde on the 10th and 11th of April 1994 by 2 US F16 jets (Christia 2012). The United Nations now depended heavily on NATO for the much-needed mediation by all necessary means. At their request NATO raided and seized weapons from Bosnian Serbs in Sarajevo on August 5, 1994. Also, at the request of UNPROFOR, NATO carried out air strikes against a Bosnian Serb tank on 22 September 1994 (Christia 2012).

Bombardment of air defence radars were conducted by NATO aircraft on 23 November 1994 to weaken the offensive of the Serbian forces after it launched attacks from a surface-to-air missile site in north-West Bosnia-Herzegovina (Christia 2012). The Srebrenica fiasco spurred up the actions of NATO and facilitated the peace enforcement efforts. NATO intensified its forceful mediation through several bombing campaigns against the Serbs. It launched Operation Deliberate Force against the Army of the Republika Srpska and this was central to ending the war (Cohen 1995), (Holbrooke 1999).

The first major dividend of the forceful mediation was signing of the Washington DC peace agreement in March 1994 between Bosniaks and Croats of Bosnia. This peace agreement served the dual purpose of ending the war between Bosniaks and Croats as well as reducing the warring parties from three to two at the expense of Bosnian Serbs as the Bosniak-Croat alliance was formed (Hendrickson 2013). The Bosniak-Croat alliance was greatly strengthened by NATO's deliberate force against the army of the Republika Srpska and accelerated the forceful mediation drives. This drive and alliance weakened the Bosnia Serbs and empowered the Bosniak-Croat alliance to recapture most of the territories thereby constituting a force to be reckoned with and a threat to the Security of Bosnian Serbs. The international community took advantage of this equilibrium cum shifting power base to mount pressure on leaders of the warring factors to the negotiation table (Boug and Shoup 2015).

6. Conclusion

Myriads of lessons abound in the Bosnia Conflict that led to the Srebrenica Massacre but the crux of it is the vacuum in the United Nations Peace Keeping operations predicated on the rule of engagement which does not permit forceful intervention except on ground of self-defense. UN peacekeepers are only permitted to attack if they were themselves attacked.

Peace Enforcement as introduced by NATO is more realistic in such a conflict. The peace enforcement operation compelled the warring factions to the negotiation table. Negotiations for Peace were held between 1 through 21 November 1995 at the Wright-

Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio and gave rise to the November 21, 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (New World Encyclopedia). The Dayton Peace Agreement also called the Dayton Accords was formally signed on December 14, 1995 in Paris. The signatories were Slobadan Milosevic (President of Serbia), Franjo Tudjman (President of Croatia), and Alija Izetbegovic – as the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Akyol 2015).

Hinged on the Dayton Accord, Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided between two entities. The division was such that 51 percent of the territory was shared to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina – a composition of Bosniaks and Croats on the one hand and 49 percent of the territory was shared to the Republika Srpska – a composition of Serbs on the other hand (Akyol 2015).

The study recommends that the Peace Enforcement operations of the United Nations should be overhauled and reinforced so as not to depend on NATO. This is because NATO was originally designed for the Collective Defense of the North Atlantic area. Partisanship may not be completely ruled out in some conflicts where their vital interest is at stake.

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